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APPOINTMENT AS A MEANS OF INITIAL
ACCESSION TO ELECTIVE STATE COURTS
OF LAST RESORT
JAMES

HERNDON*

INTRODUCTION

For some years legal scholars, judges, and members of the
bar, as well as an assorted company of those who consider
themselves friends of the legal profession have debated the
merits of various means of judicial selection.! Parties to the
debate have generally centered their arguments on the propriety of subjecting judges, prospective or incumbent, to popular election. Proponents of such a technique for staffing the
bench, it must be noted, are either inarticulate or extremely
few in number-if one may judge such matters from the infrequent presentation of their point of view in professional
journals. When and where offered, however, arguments for
popular election most often seem to employ a common premise having to do with the "proper" means for the conduct of
democracy, perceiving in attempts at reform of judicial selection methods some threat to our particular institutions and
the techniques of self-government they represent.!
If those who favor popular election appear to plant themselves firmly in a defensive stance, the proponents of change
have equally well taken a crusading offensive. One reads that
elective systems do not produce judges best able to administer
justice fairly or efficiently because of the necessary connection of such systems with some particularly evil aspect of human behavior ominously referred to as "politics." For its part,
"politics" seems to include everything objectionable from the
rigors of campaigning and the uncertainty necessarily associated with elective office to the submission (or the suspicion
of having submitted) to extra-judicial influences such as partisan or factional machines. Good men, it is argued, are repelled by the former; the latter has its obvious defects and
;e Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of North Dakota.
writer wishes to acknowledge the assistance of a University of North
Dakota Faculty Grant-in-Aid in meeting expenses incurred in completing
the research reported here. Special thanks are due to Miss Rosalie Ann
Cameron, who assisted in the early stages of data compilation and analysis.
1. A review of this debate as well as an extensive annotated bibliography of relevant sources may be found in HAYNES, SELECTION AND

TENURE OF JUDGES (1944).

2. See, e. g., Moran, Counter-4.llssouri
Judges, 32 Fla. B.J. 471 (1958).
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can operate, at best, only to harass and confound the man of
integrity.'
If the disability of "politics" is not sufficient in itself, however, a further argument can be, and has been, presented: the
voters do not really care about electing judges. This point is
supported by reference to a host of voting statistics indicating the considerably lesser percentage of voters who mark
their ballots for judicial candidates than for nominees for
other offices.'
The opposition to popular election does not confine'itself, of
course, to a catalogue of charges. In a very constructive way
it generally settles on an alternative means of selecting judges
most often represented by an outright embrace of the "Missouri Plan" or some variant thereof designed to appeal to a
particular locality.' This plan involves, briefly, three essential steps: (1) the compilation of a list of suitable candidates
for the bench by a commission representing the bench, the
bar and the public; (2) the appointment by the governor of
some one candidate selected from this list to a vacancy and
(3) the placing of the candidate's name before the electorate
at the first general election following twelve months' service
with the only question being whether the incumbent should
be retained in office This system, it seems, combines the best
features of a number of systems while eliminating most, if
not all, of their disadvantages. There may occur, thus, the involvement of the electorate in the choice (or more accurately,
agreement in someone else's choice) of its governors, the removal of judicial selection from the sullying influences of
"politics"-since judges run unopposed and are by law fqrbidden to participate in partisan affairs, and the exertion of
the influence of expert and knowing opinion-enter the commission-in the process of chosing judges.'
It is not the purpose of this article to suggest a solution to
3. For a sampling of such opinion, see, Garwood, Breakfast Observations on Selection of Juidges, 44 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 134 (1960); Gershenson,
A Reply Concerning Missouri Court Plan, 33 Fla. B.J. 22 (1959); Schrader,
Judicial Selection: Taking the Courts Out of Polities, 46 A.B.A.J. 1115
(1960).
4. See, e. g., Martinez, A Layman's View of Wyoming Judicial Selection, 15 Wyo. L.J. 53 (1960).
5. In Pennsylvania, for example, this method is known as the "Pennsylvania Plan"; see Keefe, Judges and Politics: the Pennsylvania Plan of
Judge Selection, 20 U. Pitt. L.R. 621 (1959).
6. For further description, see, ADRIAN, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (1960) 359; and GRAVES, AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENT
(4th ed., 1953), 612-13.
7. The "advantages" of the Missouri Plan are defended in Garwood,
supra note 3, 139; and Gershenson, Experience in Missouri with Judicial
Selection under the Non-Partisan Plan, 46 A.B.A.J. 287 (1960).
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the very vexing question of the "best" means of judicial selection. By default, or perhaps by an uncommonly wise choice,
our society has seemingly abandoned this field to professional
students, scholars and practitioners of the law. Intrusion, in
form of suggested solutions, into this preserve would at best
be indiscrete. A contribution to understanding, however,
might do much to aid in the development of solutions. It has
been the goal of the research presented here to do just that,
to illumine one area of the debate on the merits of popular
election which seemed to the writer heretofore to have been
neglected.
Throughout the literature on judicial selection, discourse
appears to have taken place primarily on a hypothetical and
projective- a "what is likely to happen if. . ."-basis. Those
who favor electoral devices argue that our institutions may
be in danger if particular changes are made; those opposed to
such techniques predict improvement in the administration of
justice if alternate techniques can be devised and made operational. There has, however, been little attention, grounded in
specifically empirical referents, paid to what occurs now, to
the actual differences in operation of our present and variant
means of selecting judges A very worthy inquiry might take
the form, assuming suitable and agreed upon criteria were
available, of assessing in a rigorously empirical manner the
differences in the quality of justice and the fitness of the men
who dispense it as meted out by elective and appointive courts.
Less ambitiously, perhaps, one might also ask to what extent
and under what sorts of conditions do elective and appointive
courts differ in terms of the actual means by which judges
reach the bench; to what extent are ostensibly elective judges
in fact appointed and in what ways, if any, are differing degrees of isolation of judicial selection from partisan machinery and shifts in state-wide partisan supremacy related to
variations in that extent.
The remainder of this article is devoted to suggesting answers to these questions. It is hoped thereby that the debates
8. Several writers have averred that with regard to the courts whose
members are ostensibly selected through electoral means, most judges are
in fact appointed; no data supporting these statements have been presented however, nor has there been any recognition of variations in the extents to which appointment might occur, let alone any attempt to account
for such variations. See, e. g., ADRIAN, op. cit. supra, note 6 at p. 359;
GRAVES, op. cit. supra, at pp. 610-11; National Conference on Judicial Selection and Court Administration, Judicial Selection, Discipline, Retirement;
"How Should Judges be Selected"
27 J.B.A.D.C. 26; and Turley, Judicial
Selection and Tenure, 25 Tenn. L. Rev. 352 (1958).
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on judicial selection may be directed more easily toward an
agreeable solution.
Before proceeding, however, it might be well to present at
this point something of an overview of selection processes for
judges of state courts of last resort.' During the period covered by this research (1948-1957), of the forty-eight states,
thirty-six provided for the selection of judges of such courts
by popular election; of the thirty-six, twenty required that at
both the nominational and electoral stages candidates for
judicial office bear partisan labels;1" eleven forbade partisan
designation during both nominational and electoral processes 1
while an additional four permitted partisan designation during nominations but not at the general election." The remaining state3 shifted during the period studied from a practice of
partisan nomination and election to one of denial of partisan
designation at both stages.
Though concern is not had here with the appointive courts
as such, it may be of interest, for comparative purposes, to
suggest relevant differences in appointive modes. Of the
twelve appointive courts, two followed the so-called "Missouri
Plan," or a variant thereof." Another three states provided for
gubernatorial appointment subject to consent by another
branch of the executive department, 5 while in still another
three states gubernatorial appointment was subject to legis0
lative review."
The remaining four states limited the right of
appointment to the legislature."
PROGRAM

OF RESEARCH

The research reported here is based on an attempt (1)
to ascertain how members of all state courts of last resort
serving at any time on other than an expressly temporary
basis during the ten year period from 1948-1957 achieved
9.

The following summaries of judicial selection procedures are drawn

from COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE COURTS OF LAST RESORT OF THE FORTY-EIGHT STATES (1950), 8-14; and INSTITUTE OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, SELECTION, TENURE AND REMOVAL OF
JUDGES IN THE 48 STATES, ALASKA, HAWAII AND PUERTO RICO
(1956), 2-3.

10.

Alabama,

Iowa, Kansas,

Arkansas,

Colorado,

Kentucky, Louisiana,

Florida, Georgia,

Mississippi,

Illinois,

New Mexico,

Indiana,

New York,

North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas and West Virginia.
11. Idaho, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
12.
13.
14.
15.

16.
17.

Arizona, Maryland, Michigan and Ohio.
Utah.
California and Missouri.
Maine, Massachusetts and New Hampshire.

Connecticut, Delaware and New Jersey.
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont and Virginia.
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their positions; and (2) to relate differences in accessional
means to specific degrees of isolation of judicial selection
from partisan machinery and shifts in state-wide partisan
supremacy as noted above. Table I sets out in aggregate form
a number of basic data pertinent to the first of these questions." Indicated here under the broad headings of appointive
and elective courts are the number of judges involved and
their respective means of initial accession to the bench. Prime
interest centers, of course, on the means of accession of judges
on the elective courts; data relevant to appointive courts are
presented only for purposes of comparison.
Table I.
Bench.'

State Courts of Last Resort-Initial Means of Accession to the

Appointive Courts
Number of Justices ..........................
130
Number Elected Initially -------...........
32
Number Appointed Initially ...........
127
Percentage Appointed Initially
97.2
Percentage Elected Initially -----------2.8

Elective Courts
434
192
242
55.8
44.2

1. Unless otherwise noted computations presented in this and following tables are based on accessional means for all judges who were other
than expressly temporary members of the thirty-six elective State courts
of last resort during the years 1948-1957.
2. Judges elected to the Supreme Court of Missouri before the present,
appointive, plan came into effect.

As Table I points out, slightly under 56% of judges serving
on elective courts during the time period studied reached the
bench initially through appointment. The use of aggregate
numbers of judges may, however, conceal the extent to which
individual elective courts are staffed by appointment. Table
II sets out the numbers and percentages of courts having
more elected than appointed members, more appointed than
elected members and those in which the numbers of appointed and elected judges reach parity. An even one-half (18) of
the elective courts, it can be seen, were composed of judges
a majority of whom were appointed, very slightly under 39%
of the elective courts predominated in elected members, while
just over 11% of the elective courts had as many appointed
as elected judges.
To view essentially the same data from a different viewpoint, reference may be had to Table III in which are detailed
18. Names of all judges as well as their tenure and respective means of
accession were derived primarily from the listings contained in the relevant regional (West) REPORTER; where necessary (because of lack of
all relevant information) these data were supplemented through communication with the Clerk of the court concerned.
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Table II. Elective State Courts of Last Resort-Predominate Means of
Initial Accession.
Predominant Means of Initial
Percentage
Number
Accession
50.0
18
A p poin tim ent ---------------------------.----............
...............-.
. ....
_--------------Election -------

Parity ........................................................
Totals ......................................................

14

38.9

. .4
. . 36

11.1
100.0

mean (average) percentages of judges appointed to courts in
each of the three classifications employed in Table II. Thus,
with regard to the predominately appointive "elective"
courts, it may be seen that roughly 77% of the accessions
covered were by appointive means; for the predominately
elective courts, approximately two-thirds of the accessions involved were by elective means. Given the data presented in
Tables I through III, it does not seem untoward to conclude
that the electoral process plays a role of at best moderate
dimensions in staffing state courts of last resort. The somewhat impressionistic observations of those who have made
evaluations of the efficacy of judicial elections are, it would
seem, confirmed by these data."
Table III. Elective State Courts of Last Resort-Means of Initial Accession--by Percentages.
Predominant Means of Initial
Mean Percentage of
Mean Percentage of
Accession
Appointed Judges
Elected Judges
Appointment ..................................
.
. 77.2
22.8
Election ......................-........... .
33.8
66.2
Parity ................................................
.
. 50.0
50.0

There is, however, another aspect of the efficacy of electoral procedures to be considered. As may be noted from
Table IV the relative proportions of appointed judges serving
on ostensibly elective courts is not a constant; there are, in
fact, rather wide disparities in this regard, the percentage of
appointed judges ranging from a low of 12.5 for Alabama to
a high of 100.0 for Maryland, South Dakota and Wyoming.
An immediate question arises, of course, in accounting for
these variances. One might inquire at the outset whether the
extents of observable variations are a function of variant
means of filling vacancies. Thus, if particular states were to
require special elections for replacement of deceased or retired judges, the extent of appointment would be correspondingly reduced. There is, however, considerable uniformity
19.

Supra, note 8.
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Table IV. Elective State Courts of Last Resort-Variances in Percentages of Initially Appointed Judges.
Percentage Appointed
100.0
80.0-99.9
60.0-79.9
40.0--69.9
20.0-39.9,
1.0-19.9
0.0

Number of Courts
3
4
10
9
8
2
0

among relevant constitutional and statutory provisions in
this regard. Virtually every state has specified that vacancies
are to be filled by gubernatorial appointment with the election of a successor to serve the remainder of the unexpired
term taking place at the next succeeding general election.'
The very few exeception to this general practice cannot, on the
basis of their relative numerical insignificance, account for
the variations evidenced in Table IV. One must look elsewhere
for an explanation.
To aid in discovering such an explanation, the elective
courts were classified according to the extent to which their
respective selection mechanisms were linked with or isolated
from partisan machinery. Three such classifications were
developed: "Partisan" systems, in which at both nominational
and electoral stages, judicial candidates are identified with
partisan labels; "Semi-Partisan" systems, in which nominees
are chosen by partisan conventions or primary elections but
in which at general elections partisan identification is lacking; and "Non-Partisan" systems in which party labels appear in neither the nominational nor electoral processes. The
respective numbers and percentages of judges appointed and
elected initially within each of these classifications are set
out in Table V.
Table V. "Partisan," "Semi-Partisan," and "Non-Partisan" Elective State
Courts of Last Resort and Respective Means of Initial Selection.
Partisan Semi-Partisan Non-Paxtisan
(Number of
(Number of (Number of
Courts=11)'
Courts=4)
Courts-20)
27
86
Number Appointed Initially ------ 138
41
133
20
Number Elected Initially .........
70.5
54.7
51.0
Percentage Appointed Initially .
29.5
45.3
49.0
Percentage Elected Initially
1. Data relevant to the Utah Supreme Court have not been included
in this Table or in Tables VI and VIII owing to a shift in judicial selection
methods in that State from "Partisan" to "Non-Partisan,". during the period
studied.
20. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, op. cit. supra note 9, Table
4, following p. 16.
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As attention to Table V will indicate, the percentage of appointed judges increases as one moves in the direction of increasing isolation of the electoral process from paristan machinery, i. e., away from the "Partisan" system and in the direction of the "Non-Partisan" system. Table VI, in which data
for "Semi-Partisan" and "Non-Partisan" systems are combined suggests perhaps more strongly the differences in percentages of appointed judges as these are related to differences in the involvement of partisan machinery.
Table VI. "Partisan" and "Semi-Partisan" and "Non-Partisan" (combined) Elective State Courts of Last Resort and Respective Means of
Initial Selection.
Semi-Partisan and
Partisan
Non-Partisan
(Number of Courts=20) (Number of Courts=15)'
Number Appointed
Initially
138
113
Number Elected
Initially
133
61
Percentage Appointed
Initially
51.0
66.3
Percentage Elected
33.7
49.0
Initially
1. For exclusion of one state (Utah), see note to Table V.

The data do not, of course, in themselves, present any explanation by which one might account for the apparent tendency of frequency of appointment to increase as selection
processes are isolated from normal partisan activities. One
might, however, entertain the following speculations: (a) the
"normal" pattern of judicial selection and tenure with respect
to the elective courts appears to be one of initial appointment,
followed by successive re-elections to office until death or resignation terminates a career in mid-term; a new judge is appointed and the cycle continues with appointment maintaining a clear predominance over election as a means of initial
accession; (b) the process may be disrupted, however, and the
number of initial accessions by election increased if (1) the
expiration of one's term and the necessity to stand for reelection happen to coincide with what Campbell, et al, have
called a "realigning election,"' ' i. e., an election in which
wholesale shifts of electoral sentiment take place and substitutions of one party's candidates for the incumbents of the opposition occur as a result; and (2) if the judicial candidate
21.

CA.MPBELL, et al, THE AMERICAN VOTER (1960), pp. 531 ff.

NORTH

DAKOTA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

concerned happens to bear the label of the party now rejected
by the voters; (c) such occurences would seem to have less
impact on the stability and length of judicial tenure (and its
accompanying predominance of appointment as a means of
initial accession) the less well-known was the candidate's
partisan attachments as in the case of "semi-" and "non-partisan" systems; where partisan loyalties are most obvious,
i. e., in the case of "partisan" electoral systems, one would
anticipate the greatest impact of the events described and the
corresponding rise in the number and percentage of initial accessions by election.
The proposition may be stated more concisely: appointment
as a means of initial accession occurs more frequently than
election in the case of "Semi-" and "Non-Partisan" elective
courts owing to the greater isolation of the electoral fates of
judges on these courts (relative to that of judges on the "Partisan" courts) from the vicissitudes of inter-partisan competition and the resultant opportunities for such judges to serve
until death or resignation-which events simply occasion another appointment and continuance of the "normal" cycle.
This hypothesis could, of course, be tested by a determination of the extent to which electoral defeat constitutes a
means of judicial retirement within each of the classifications
employed in Tables V and VI as well as by careful examination of the fate of judicial candidates and incumbents standing for election during periods of partisan turn-over. These
questions are, however, beyond the scope of the present investigation.
That the hypothesis offered is not altogether without support is suggested by Table VII in which are set out respective
numbers and percentages of appointed judges serving on elective courts in states which underwent changes in partisan
control at the uppermost state level. There is, unfortunately,
no generally agreed-upon method to indicate such shifts; some
might consider changes in the relative legislative strength of
the two parties as indicative of change, while others would
rely, for the same purpose, on the degree to which the entire
executive slate of a given party is successful in retaining or
achieving office; an additional approach would involve, as
employed here, fluctuations in the state-wide two-party vote
for governor. The first measure, that of relative legislative
strength, may be misleading owing essentially to the various
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methods in use of structuring legislative districts as to reduce
or mask the potential strength of a particular party and thus
prevent its representation from becoming commensurate with
the degree of support obtained for its individual candidates.
Reliance on the success of executive slates may prove faulty
owing to the fact that not all states permit such extensive use
of the franchise (and the resultant "long ballot") as do
others, thus reducing the degree of comparability essential to
present purposes.
Table VII. Change in Partisan Gubernatorial Control and Relation to Percentages of Initially Appointed Judges on Elective State Courts of Last

Resort.

Magnitude of Change'
Stable
(Number of States:15)
Proximate Shifts

Mean Percentage of
Initially Appointed
Judges2

Mean Percentage of
Initially Elected
2
Judges

67.5

32.5

63.5

36.5

Number of States=10)
Gross Shifts
57.3
42.7
(Number of States=8)
(Total Number of States=33)
1. Electoral data were derived from 3 SCAMMON, AMERICA VOTES
(1959).
2.
Percentages were derived from accessions occurring during the years
1948-1957 only.
3. Data relevant to three states, Nebraska, Nevada and Tennessee, were
not included in this or the following Table owing to the occurrence of only
one initial accession to the court of last resort in each of these states during the period studied.

Given the above considerations use was made here as noted
of the state-wide two-party vote for governor. Objectionable
on some counts, this measure may nevertheless be assumed to
serve well enough for detection of major shifts in partisan
control. Maintenance of the relative majority-minority positions of the two parties is considered in Table VII as an absence of shift in control and is designated as "Stability." The
displacement of one party by the other in terms of gubernatorial control with the displacing party receiving from
50.1% to 54.9% of the state-wide two-party vote is considered
as a "Proximate" shift, while displacements involving 55.0%
and above are characterized as "Gross" shifts. These divisions
are admittedly somewhat arbitrary, but they will, it would
seem, provide sufficient evidence for the kinds of shifts contemplated here.
Finally, with reference to Table VII, it must be noted that
the basic data differ somewhat from those employed previously in this report. As the data relevant to general partisan
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shifts are those represented by the gubernatorial elections occurring during the time period studied, it was necessary for
purposes of comparison to limit the concern with variations
in accessional means to the same period. The percentages of
appointed judges, as presented in Table VII, are only for
those judges taking their places during the years 1948-1957
and do not include those judges serving at any time during
that period but whose accession may have occurred before
1948.
With these considerations in mind, an examination of Table
VII will indicate that the "Stable" states have the largest percentage of appointed judges (just over two thirds), while
those experiencing "Gross" shifts of partisan control have
the least percentage of appointments, with states undergoing
"Proximate" shifts occupying (with respect to the percentage of appointed judges) a point near midway between. It
would thus appear that the greater the shift in partisan control, the greater is the percentage of elected judges and the
smaller the percentage of appointed judges. Such a conclusion
would seem to support further the hypothesis advanced above
in consideration of the relationship between percentages of
appointed judges and the relative insulation of the selection
process from partisan political machinery. Such a hypothesis
is advanced only tentatively, its confirmation depending ultimately on the type of further investigation discussed above.
As a final operation, the two variables, i. e., those of electoral selection processes and shifts in partisan control, were
combined. Again, because of the use of statistics of elections
occuring with the ten year period studied, data relevant to
the accessional means of only those judges who first reached
the bench during this period were employed. Table VIII sets
out the results of this combination, using only the respective
percentages of appointed judges.
As Table VIII indicates the percentage of appointed judges
is greatest for courts in states undergoing the least amount
of change in partisan control of the governorship and whose
judicial selection methods are most isolated from partisan
political processes. Conversely, the percentage of appointed
judges is smallest for courts in states experiencing large
scale shifts in gubernatorial control and whose means for selecting judges are associated with partisan machinery. Appointment as a means of initial acccession to the bench would
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Table VIII. Elective State Courts of Last Resort, Change in Partisan
Gubernatorial Control and Respective Percentages of Judges Initially
Appointed.'
Mean Percentage of
Initially Appointed
Judges

Number of
Courts

49.2
52.5
53.9

3
6
10

Electoral Selection
System
Partisan

Magnitudes
of Change
Gross
Proximate
Stable

Semi-Partisan and
Non-Partisan

Gross
Proximate

62.1
80.0

Stable

78.3

Total=19
5
4

4
Total=13
Total Number of
Courts= 322

1. For derivation of mean percentage of initially appointed judges and
electoral data, see notes 1 and 2 to Table VII.
2. For purposes in exclusion of four states, see note 1 to Table V and
note 3 to Table VII.

seem to occur, thus, most often in states having relatively
stable inter-partisan relationships and employing either a
"Semi-Partisan" or "Non-Partisan" mode of judicial selection. Initial accession through election, on the other hand, occurs most frequently in states with flutuating partisan dominance and with wholly "Partisan" means of choosing judges.
SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSIONS

The research reported in this article attempted to ascertain
to what extent judges on the courts of last resort of the
thirty-six states employing elective means of judicial selection were in fact initially appointed, and further, to determine
if particular variables were in any way related to differences
in such extents. The variables chosen for study were (1) the
extent of involvement in or isolation from partisan political
machinery of individual systems of election; and (2) changes
in partisan dominance of state offices as measured by alterations in partisan control of the governorship and the electoral magnitudes by which such alterations may have been
effected.
Findings based on these considerations were the following:
(1) Slightly under 56% (55.8%) of judges serving on the
thirty-six elective courts during the time period studied
(1948-1957) took their places on the bench initially through
appointive means.
(2) Appointment was the predominant means of initial accession for one-half of the thirty-six elective courts, while
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election was the predominant means of accession for fourteen
courts (38.9%) ; an equal number of judges were appointed
and elected on four courts (11.1%).
(3) The average percentage of initially appointed judges
on courts for which appointment was the predominant mode
of initial accession was 77.2%, while the average percentage
of initially appointed judges on courts for which election was
the predominant mode of initial accession was 33.8%.
(4) The percentage of initially appointed judges serving on
the thirty-six elective courts was not a constant; to the contrary this percentage varied from a high of 100.0% for three
states to a low of 12.5% for one state.
(5) Variations in the extent of initially appointed judges
cannot, it appears, be accounted for by variations in constitutional or statutory provisions for filling vacancies. The few
exceptions from a practice of gubernatorial appointment followed by selection of successor to fill the unexpired term, if
any, at an election next following the occurence of a vacancy
are not sufficient in number to explain the variations remarked in (4) above.
(6) Variations in the extent of appointment as a means of
initial judicial accession do appear to be related to the extent
of involvement of electoral selection methods in partisan political processes. Thus, the percentage of appointed judges is
greatest for the "Semi-Partisan" and "Non-Partisan" systems
(in both of which judges stand for election without partisan
designations) and least for the "Partisan" systems (in which
partisan labels are present at the general election).
(7) Variations as noted appear also to be related to the
absence or presence of shifts in partisan control of the governorship as well as to the magnitude of electoral pluralities by
which such shifts took place. Thus, in states undergoing no
such shifts (those designated here as "Stable"), the percentage of appointed judges is greater than for those states which
did experience such changes. The percentage of appointed
judges is, further, lower for those states evidencing what were
here labelled "Gross" shifts in partisan control than for those
states in which the magnitude of change as measured by electoral pluralities was smaller (those noted here as "Proximate" shifts).
(8) When the two variables of extents of involvement of
electoral processes in partisan machinery and shifts in parti-
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san gubernatorial dominance were combined, it was found
that the greatest percentage of appointed judges was to be
found on courts in states with the greatest degree of isolation
from paristan operations and which underwent little or no
change in partisan control. The least percentage of appointed
judges, conversely, was to be found on courts whose selection
processes were partisan and which served states which underwent the greatest shifts in partisan dominance of the governorship.
(9) It was hypothesized that the relationships observed
between variations in percentages of appointed judges and the
two variables discussed in (6), (7), and (8), above, may be
due to the greater isolation of the electoral fates of judges
on "Semi-" and "Non-Partisan" courts (relative to that of
judges on the "Partisan" courts) from the vicissitudes of
inter-partisan competition and the greater opportunity resulting from such isolation for those judges so situated to retain
office until death or resignation-at which time a new judge
may be appointed and the cycle continued. It must be emphasized that neither the data nor the manipulations performed on
them support such a hypothesis. The hypothesis has been
advanced merely for purposes of guiding further research in
this area.

"Judges must be chaste as Caesar's wife, neither be, nor
so much as suspected in the least to be unjust."
SIR FRANCIS BACON-Letter, 1616
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